Venture capital financing is characterized by extensive use of convertible debt and stage financing. In a model where an entrepreneur obtains funding for a project from a venture capitalist, we illustrate an advantage of convertible debt, over a mixture of debt and equity, in stage financing situations. Essentially, when the venture capitalist retains the option to abandon the project, the entrepreneur has an incentive to engage in "window dressing" or short-termism, that is, to bias positively the short-term performance of the project in order to reduce the probability that the project will be liquidated. Such behavior reduces the likelihood of liquidation but, at the same time, it also increases the probability that the venture capitalist will convert debt into equity, reducing the entrepreneur's profits. An appropriately designed convertible debt contract succeeds in preventing short-termistic signal manipulation (window dressing) by the entrepreneur.
Introduction
Because of the great uncertainty and high failure risk of new ventures, a widely used financing technique by venture capital companies is the infusion of capital over time. The venture capitalist who provides the funds retains the option to abandon the venture at any stage whenever the forward looking net present value of the project is negative. Each financing round is usually related to a significant stage in the development process, such as completion of design, pilot production, first profitability results, or the introduction of a second product. At every stage, new information about the venture is released (Sahlman 1990, Kaplan and Strömberg 1999) .
Stage financing is appealing to the venture capitalist for two reasons. First, the option to abandon is essential because an entrepreneur will almost never stop investing in a failing project as long as others are providing capital (Admati and Pfleiderer 1994) . Second, since abandonment of the project by the venture capitalist typically forces the entrepreneur to liquidate the project, the option to abandon creates incentives for the entrepreneur to maximize value and meet goals. 1
Stage financing may not always work as a value enhancing motivating factor since the threat of liquidation might induce the entrepreneur to aim for short-term success rather than long-term value creation. For example, an entrepreneur can make the conditions under which a project will be evaluated (whether it is the test of a prototype or a market test) more favorable, increasing the likelihood of good interim performance that gives an impression of quality that is better than the project's "true" quality. The venture capitalist then has to decide whether to continue investing in the project on the basis of this interim performance. Furthermore, it is often hard to fully and unequivocally specify what is meant by "good interim performance." For instance, when evaluating whether a "working 1 Gompers (1995) provides evidence that the number of stage financing rounds increases with the fraction of intangible assets. Sahlman (1988) describes how the entrepreneur may try to improve short-term performance in order to make sure that the project will be refinanced. See also Barry (1994) , Lerner (1995) , and Bernhardt, Hollifield, and Hughson (1996) .
prototype" indeed works, a great deal of subjective judgement must be exerted. We believe that this is a central feature of venture capital stage financing situations.
In our model, this situation is captured by assuming that interim performance (the "signal") is nonverifiable and that short-termistic signal manipulation consists of making a good signal more likely to appear. The entrepreneur manipulates the signal by shifting the probability mass from low realizations of a nonverifiable but commonly observed interim performance signal to higher realizations of the signal. We refer to such signal manipulation as window dressing.
We argue that convertible debt, which is widely used in venture capital financing, can attenuate entrepreneurs' incentives to engage in window dressing activities. In the model, there are two components to the shift of mass: on the one hand, it makes "bad" projects look "acceptable" (conditional on the observed signal) and, therefore, pass the refinancing threshold; on the other hand it inevitably also makes genuinely "acceptable" projects look "good." By manipulating short-term signals the entrepreneur reduces the probability of liquidation but, at the same time, increases the probability that, in the event of refinancing, the venture capitalist will decide to exercise the debt conversion option, becoming the owner of a substantial fraction of the venture. If the terms of conversion are set in advance to be sufficiently favorable to the venture capitalist, the entrepreneur will not engage in as much short-term signal manipulation in comparison to a situation where only straight debt-equity financing is used. A central element of our analysis is the determination of an appropriate conversion ratio and a suitable maximal amount of convertible debt that will ensure that the project is financed, but at the same time will deter the entrepreneur from manipulating the signal. 2 2 We wish to stress two points. First, signal manipulation (window dressing) involves a rightward shift of mass for the signal, leaving the project's "fundamentals" unchanged. In fact, we are careful to model signal manipulation in a way that leaves the unconditional distribution of profits (i.e., the ex-ante profits, prior to the observation of the signal) unchanged. (Signal manipulation affects, of course, the conditional distribution of profits at the interim stage.) Second, the kind of signal manipulation we are concerned with is not to be interpreted as signal jamming. The latter type of manipulation involves adding noise to a signal rendering it less precise. In contrast, the rightward shift of mass reduces the probability of low realizations An analogous effect occurs if the entrepreneur issues warrants to the venture capitalist. If the terms of conversion of warrants to regular shares are set in advance and are sufficiently favorable to the venture capitalist, the entrepreneur will not engage in as much shorttermistic signal manipulation in comparison to a situation where only straight debt-equity financing is used. 3 The debt conversion option, at a pre-specified conversion ratio, can be interpreted in terms of "renegotiation design," a concept suggested by Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1994) . They show that if the bargaining power in various renegotiation contingencies can be allocated in advance in a credible manner, the first best allocation can be implemented despite nonverifiability of a commonly observed signal. In our model, agreeing on a debt conversion option at a predetermined price is conceptually equivalent to agreeing on the degree of bargaining power that the venture capitalist will have after observing the nonverifiable signal. A convertible security can therefore be seen as a simple way to design the renegotiation process in the ex-ante contract.
Most existing explanations for the use of convertible debt are centered on ex-ante asymmetries of information between managers and investors regarding the firm's value and riskiness. By contrast, in venture capital financing it is typically the case that ex-ante, at the time of initial financing, the entrepreneur and the financier are equally informed regarding the project's chances of success, and the project's true quality is gradually revealed to both parties, with the main conflict of interest being the asymmetry of information regarding the entrepreneur's actions. A notable exception is Green (1984) , where convertible debt affects of the signal and increases the probability of high realizations, and is not related in any simple manner to signal precision. We believe that this kind of manipulation captures well the situation we are modeling. To the best of our knowledge, this form of signal manipulation has not been studied before.
3 Convertible preferred equity is also commonly used in venture capital financing. Until conversion, a convertible preferred stock promises a fixed dividend (and hence is similar to convertible debt). Unlike debt, failure to pay the dividend does not trigger liquidation; rather, the unpaid dividends accrue and must be paid before any dividends are paid out to common stock holders. Our model applies, with minor changes, to convertible preferred equity as well. Other major advantages of preferred shares are the favorable tax treatment and the fact that preferred shares carry votes with them. Since our model abstracts from taxes and control rights, it would make little difference if we used convertible preferred equity rather than convertible debt.
the inclination of the entrepreneur to engage in risky projects, and is therefore particularly useful in start-up financing situations. See also Biais, Bisière, and Décamps (1998) , who analyze a situation where the type of securities used in financing a project (e.g., convertible debt) is affected by the trade-off between anticipated financial distress costs and the need to incentivize managers to exert effort, and Berglöf (1994) , who looks at the role of convertible securities in mitigating the distributional conflicts associated with a future sale of the firm.
Of related interest is Hellmann (1998) who studies a venture capital financing situation where an entrepreneur might lose sight of the big picture, focusing too narrowly on meeting short-term goals. Hellman concentrates on an optimal debt-equity mix as a financing solution. Marx (1998) argues that a mix of debt and equity dominates only equity and only debt financing by generating the right incentives for the venture capitalist to intervene in the project as a response to poor performance. Bergemann and Hege (1998) study a model with venture capital financing, focusing on the optimal compensation of the entrepreneur in order to provide him with the right incentives for the allocation of funds. Repullo and Suarez (1998) focus on the advisory role of the venture capitalist and look at the optimal contractual arrangement when a double sided moral hazard problem arises. Schmidt (2000) also focuses on a double sided moral hazard problem and shows that convertible debt can induce both parties to invest efficiently.
In the next section we present the model under the assumption that debt-equity contracts cannot be renegotiated, and show how the introduction of convertible securities generates an improvement for both parties. In Section 3 we relax this restriction, showing that the main result of the paper still holds. We further discuss the analogy between debt conversion and contract renegotiation, interpreting the debt conversion option, at pre-determined terms, as a specific renegotiation mechanism.
In Section 4 we further extend the model by introducing an additional decision for the entrepreneur-whether or not to exert effort which affects long-term profits. The basic results are unaffected by this generalization of the model. In Section 5 we study alternative specifications of the joint distribution of signal and output. We show that the main result, and the analysis in general, are robust to non-trivial changes in specification. Section 6 concludes.
The Model

The Basic Set-Up
At time 0 an entrepreneur considers undertaking a project with uncertain returns. There are two possible states of nature: with probability 1/2 the state is "good", which we denote h, and with probability 1/2 the state is "bad," l. The project generates a (stochastic) output, π i , distributed exponentially on the interval [0, ∞), with density λ i e −λ i π i where 1/λ i is the mean of π i for i = h, l. Let
i.e. 1/λ h , the mean of π h , is larger than 1/λ l , the mean of π l , but the difference between these means is not "too large." 4
The entrepreneur has no capital and, therefore, will ask a venture capitalist to lend him the required funds. The total amount of money necessary for the project is I 1 + I 2 , of which I 1 must be invested at time 0, and I 2 can be delayed until time 1, provided that the project is not liquidated.
Stage financing
At time 1, a signal, x, about the project's quality (the state of nature) is realized and is observed by the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist. 5 The signal can be, for example, 4 The need for the latter assumption will become clear later. 5 The information structure and the statistical properties of the signal will be described in detail shortly.
the short-term performance of the project, observed by both parties who update their expectations about the quality of the project. After observing the signal, the venture capitalist decides whether to refinance the project and supply I 2 to the entrepreneur, or liquidate. For simplicity, we assume that the payoff to both parties following liquidation is zero.
The venture capitalist will refinance if his interim payoff is positive. If the project is refinanced, the output is realized at time 2, and is distributed to the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist according to the contract that has been agreed upon.
In principle, the venture capitalist could commit at time 0 to supply both amounts I 1 and I 2 , irrespectively of the signal. To underline the problem created by window dressing, we assume that
which implies that committing I 1 + I 2 at time 0 is not a viable solution to the window dressing problem. This assumption allows us to illustrate our point in a much sharper manner, but it is not necessary at all: even if ex-ante profits without stage financing were positive, the venture capitalist would always prefer to finance the project in stages, since he thus keeps the option to abandon the project, and the danger of window dressing would arise. Assumption (2) allows us to say that if the venture capitalist does not succeed in preventing signal manipulation (by means of an appropriately designed contract), the project will not be financed at all, underlining the loss of surplus.
Ex-post profits with debt-equity financing
Suppose the venture capitalist can provide funding to the entrepreneur in the form of debt, equity, or a combination of the two. We denote a debt-equity contract by (d, s) , where d is the amount of debt that the entrepreneur owes the venture capitalist, and s is the fraction of the enterprise's equity owned by the venture capitalist. For the sake of clarity, in this section we restrict attention to debt-equity contracts that cannot be renegotiated at time 1. 6
Consider the debt-equity contract (d, s). The magnitudes d and s are determined at time 0 and do not change throughout the life-time of the venture. At time 0, I 1 is supplied.
At time 1, if the project is not liquidated after observing the signal, I 2 is supplied. At time 2, the output is divided according to d and s. The promised amount d may be larger or smaller than I 1 + I 2 , the total amount of financing. 7 We assume s ∈ [0, 1), i.e. the entrepreneur must own some shares. This is easily justified on the grounds that otherwise, the entrepreneur will not make any effort for the project to succeed in the long-run. 8
Since the signal about the project's quality (observed by both parties at time 1) is not verifiable, it is not possible to write in the contract at time 0 that the provision of I 2 (refinancing) will depend on the realization of the signal. 9
Assuming limited liability and zero bankruptcy costs, the ex-post payoffs (after the state of nature is revealed but before profits are realized) to the venture capitalist and the 6 In Section 3 we relax this restriction. 7 For example, d > I1 + I2 reflects a positive interest rate. 8 In Section 4 we extend the model allowing for entrepreneurial effort that affects long-run (time 2) profits. We will show that, indeed, s < 1 is a necessary condition for inducing the entrepreneur to exert such effort.
9 Further, it is plausible that both parties will prefer to specify d and s at time 0, taking into account the entire loan I1 + I2. The intuition relies on the fact that one of the two parties may end up being held up at time 1. If the entrepreneur has enough bargaining power, then at date 1 the venture capitalist may be "locked in." For example, if the entrepreneur has all the bargaining power, then at time 1 he will offer a new debt-equity contract which guarantees the venture capitalist just enough (expected) revenue to cover I2. The venture capitalist will accept the offer since I1 is sunk. Foreseeing this, the venture capitalist will prefer to have d and s specified at time 0. A similar logic applies to the entrepreneur if his participation in the project requires an arbitrarily small amount of effort at time 0 (as we will assume in Section 4). Then, at time 1 the entrepreneur is "locked in"-since his investment in effort is sunk-and if the venture capitalist has enough bargaining power he can extract part of the entrepreneur's surplus. As a result, the entrepreneur will prefer to specify d and s at time 0. Formally endogenizing the time at which d and s are set requires more structure (how does the negotiation about d and s occur, what is the alternative in the case of disagreement, etc.) and is beyond the scope of this paper. We believe that defining the cum interest debt, d, relative to the entire amount of financing, I1 + I2, and s as a share of the ex-post profits of the project, is reasonable in the context of our model. entrepreneur from a debt-equity contract, (d, s), for i = l, h, are: This framework can accommodate the use of warrants. Suppose that all the initial debt, d 0 , is convertible at the exercise price γ dollars of debt per share, as above, and in addition, the entrepreneur issues to the venture capitalist warrants that can be converted to equity at the same rate, γ, provided that all the debt has been converted. That is, 10 For simplicity, we assume that the debt conversion ratio and the exercise price of warrants are both γ. Allowing for different conversion ratios would not, however, substantially alter the analysis in this paper, although several interesting issues would arise, such as whether it would make sense to use a contract that combines convertible debt and warrants, whether the venture capitalist would prefer to convert debt rather than exercise the warrant conversion option, and whether and by how much we should expect the conversion ratios to differ. These questions are left for future work.
we will allow the more general formulation of convertible debt cum warrants, although most of the time we will refer to it as a convertible debt contract.
The ex-post payoffs to the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur from a convertible debt contract, (d 0 , s 0 , γ, s), for i = l, h, are: 
The role of nonverifiability
If the signal x were verifiable, the parties could agree at time 0 on a contingent debt-equity capital structure, as a function of the realization of x. The above convertible debt contract could then be mimicked by a contingent debt-equity contract. Nonverifiability of x rules this out, highlighting the fundamental role of the debt conversion option which is to adjust the debt-equity structure to new information that is revealed during the life-time of the project. This feature bears resemblance to provisions allowing the provider of financing to take control of the project at an interim stage in response to nonverifiable information, a feature that is very common in incomplete contracts environments. Here, instead, the contract allows the provider of financing to alter the financial structure of the contract (to change the output allocation rule) at an interim stage in response to nonverifiable information. 11 11 A remark on the timing of events is in order. It is often the case that many convertible contracts are not exercised until the initial public offering stage, a time when some uncertainty still remains regarding the actual payoffs (e.g., uncertainty regarding the success of the initial public offering). The time of debt conversion in the model thus captures a realistic feature of venture capital financing-the decision whether to convert debt, and how much to convert, is taken after having received news, but still before full resolution
Information and signal manipulation
We turn to a detailed description of the information structure. At time 1, a signal, x, about the distribution of output is realized and observed by the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist. The signal has a continuous distribution on the interval [0, 1].
At time 0, the entrepreneur can engage in window-dressing, namely, he can affect the distribution of the signal x and, thus, artificially improve short-term performance. By artificially we mean that such activity does not affect the probability of the good state of nature, h, which remains 1/2, but simply reduces the probability of observing "bad" signals, i.e. of low realizations of x, and increases the probability of high realizations of x.
In other words, window-dressing gives the appearance of better short-term performance without actually affecting the "true" long-run performance. Let us call such activity signal manipulation and denote it a = 1, while a = 0 denotes no signal manipulation. The venture capitalist cannot observe whether the entrepreneur engages in signal manipulation. 12
Let α h (x, 0) denote the joint density function of x and h when a = 0 (no signal manipulation), and similarly, let α h (x, 1) denote the joint density function of x and h when a = 1 (signal manipulation). 13 We require that when integrating out x, we have 1 0 α h (x, 0)dx = 1 0 α h (x, 1)dx = 1/2, namely, signal manipulation does not affect the exante probabilities of the good and bad states, h and l, that remain 1/2. Analogous notation is used for the joint density functions of x and l, with and without signal manipulation, α l (x, 1) and α l (x, 0). Signal manipulation thus means transferring mass to the right, from low realizations of x to high realizations of x, keeping the overall area below the density of uncertainty. The deadline for conversion is irrelevant as long as it is prior to the total resolution of uncertainty, at time 2. Since no income accrues to the shareholders before time 2, the venture capitalist has no interest in converting debt before observing the signal x. At the end of this section we will show that it is never optimal to set the conversion deadline at time 2, after the complete resolution of uncertainty.
12 For simplicity, we assume that the entrepreneur can manipulate the signal costlessly. In Section 4 we introduce both a direct cost of signal manipulation (born by the entrepreneur) and an indirect cost-signal manipulation comes at the expense of effort devoted to the improvement of long-run performance. The results do not change in a meaningful way.
13 Recall that the state of nature is a random variable that can take on two discreet values, h and l, while the signal x is a random variable with a continuous cumulative distribution function.
functions α l (x, 1) and α h (x, 1) each equal to one half.
Let q h (x, 0) denote the probability of h conditional on having observed the signal realization x when a = 0. Therefore, q h (x, 0) =
, where the denominator denotes the marginal density of x. We assume that without signal manipulation the signal is strictly informative in the sense that higher realizations of x are associated with a higher interim prob-
is the probability of h conditional on x when a = 1.
For clarity of exposition, we will concentrate on a special case where the joint density of signal and output is linear. This allows us to write the distribution in terms of a simple expression and to simplify the analysis. We therefore assume that:
where the support of x is the interval [0, 1]; see Figure 1 .
We also model signal manipulation in a simple manner which allows us to express the rightward shift of mass in terms of a parameter k < 1/2. Manipulating the signal involves:
(1) transferring mass in the bad state, l, from the interval [0, k] to the interval (k, (1+k)/2);
and (2) transferring mass in the good state, h, from the interval (k, (1 + k)/2] to the interval Figure 1 . Thus,
Such signal manipulation increases the conditional (interim) probability of state h on the intervals (0, k) and ((1+k)/2, 1), namely, on these intervals q h (x, 1) > q h (x, 0); see Figure 1 .
As can be seen in Figure 1 , q h (x, 1) is strictly informative (i.e., strictly increasing in x) everywhere except at x = k. This is due to a specific feature of the joint distribution of signal and output that we are using, in particular to the discontinuity of α l (x, 1) at x = k.
It plays no role in the analysis nor does it drive any of the results, and is assumed only in order to simplify calculations. In Section 5 we study alternative specifications of the joint distribution of signal and output where both q h (x, 0) and q h (x, 1) are strictly informative.
Discussion: Interpreting signal manipulation
Before proceeding with the analysis, we want to briefly interpret the above model of signal manipulation. We will illustrate the robustness of our results to changes in the specification of signal manipulation, and explain which characteristics of the joint distribution of signal and output are necessary for the results to hold. 14 In particular, one may object that Figure 1 displays a very specific example, since in the interval [0, k] only α l (x, 0) is reduced as a result of signal manipulation, but not α h (x, 0). This feature is not crucial for our main result (that convertible debt discourages signal manipulation). Rather, we assume this specific feature to make sure that we are indeed modeling a "pure" window dressing phenomenon. If, for example, signal manipulation were as represented in Figure 2 , where all the mass α h (x, 0) in the interval [0, k] is moved to the right, then convertible debt would also prevent signal manipulation, but the venture capitalist would not want to discourage such manipulation. The intuition is that, in this case, the signal becomes perfect on the interval [0, k], so that the decision whether to liquidate or not by the venture capitalist is based on a very precise signal and he is better off when the signal is manipulated.
We mentioned in the introduction that it is quite common for the venture capitalist to be concerned about the entrepreneur's window dressing activities, since they reduce the effectiveness of stage financing. Therefore, the situation represented in Figure 2 is clearly not the one we are trying to capture. By contrast, the situation represented in Figure 1 is such that signal manipulation reduces the venture capitalist's payoff to such an extent that the need to prevent it is crucial. Figure 3 displays an intermediate situation, that is more realistic perhaps. In this case, part of the mass α h (x, 0) in the interval [0, k] is also shifted to the right, but signal manipulation still hurts the venture capitalist. Our analysis and main result go through for this case, but we choose to focus on the case displayed in Figure 1 (a limit case) because it saves the need to verify algebraically the conditions on parameters ensuring that signal manipulation is actually harmful to the venture capitalist.
Another characteristic of the case represented in Figure 1 is that no mass α l (x, 0) is moved to the interval [(1 + k)/2, 1). In other words, we are assuming that the entrepreneur can improve the short term performance of "bad" projects, rendering them "acceptable," only to a limited extent. Only projects that are already "acceptable" without signal manipulation can be made to appear "good." This extreme feature of our model may be attenuated (some mass α l (x, 0) may be moved to the interval [(1 + k)/2, 1) without affecting the results), but it is important for our main argument that moving mass α l (x, 0) to the interval [(1 + k)/2, 1) be more "difficult" than moving mass α h (x, 0) to this interval. This captures the essence of the type of signal manipulation we are modeling: the entrepreneur wants to bias upward the interim performance without knowing the "true" quality of the project.
As a consequence, he succeeds in passing the refinancing stage more often, but at the same time projects which would have obtained financing anyway appear to have an even better performance.
Interim payoffs with debt-equity and convertible debt financing
Consider the debt-equity contract, (d, s). Interim payoffs following the signal x are averages of ex-post payoffs, weighted by the interim conditional probabilities q h (x, a) and 1−q h (x, a), a = 0, 1, minus I 2 for the venture capitalist: 15
Analogously, for the convertible debt contract, (d 0 , s 0 , γ, s), interim payoffs following the signal x are:
15 Notice that at time 1, I1 is sunk.
whereŝ is the post-conversion equity held by the venture capitalist. If he converts the entire amount of convertible debt, thenŝ = s, while if he converts nothing,ŝ = s 0 .
The refinancing decision and ex-ante payoffs
The entrepreneur never wants to liquidate the project once it has started since he provides no financing and, because of limited liability, he always obtains a positive payoff as long as s < 1. 16 The driving force of our model is the conflict of interest between the entrepreneur, who always wants to proceed with the project, and the venture capitalist who wants to refinance the project only if the interim news regarding the probability of success are sufficiently favorable. To compute ex-ante payoffs, this refinancing/liquidation decision must be taken into account. Ex-ante payoffs are computed as weighted averages of the interim payoffs over all signal realizations that entail refinancing, minus the time 0 investment, I 1 , for the venture capitalist. The relevant expressions will be presented as we proceed.
Consider the total ex-ante surplus (i.e., the total expected profit) of the project, which is computed as a weighted average of the interim total surplus over all signal realizations for which refinancing is efficient. We want to ensure that the model's parameters are such that (1) when a = 0 this surplus is strictly positive so that without signal manipulation the project is worth undertaking; and (2) when a = 1 this surplus is strictly negative so that with signal manipulation the project is not worth undertaking.
The total ex-ante surplus is computed as follows. For a given signal realization, x, the interim total surplus is the sum of the interim payoffs of the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur, equations (4) and (5), for a = 0 and a = 1, according to the case. Let a = 0, and denote by x a=0 the smallest realization of the signal that makes the interim total surplus positive, namely, x a=0 is the refinancing/liquidation cut-off. This cut-off value is determined by
Recalling that q(x, 0) = x, (8) yields
We then compute the total ex-ante surplus of the project, for a = 0, which we assume to be strictly positive:
where x a=0 is given in (9). This guarantees that, if there is no signal manipulation, the project is worth financing, and contracts exist, both debt-equity and convertible debt, such that the ex-ante payoffs of both the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist are positive.
For later use, we make the assumption x a=0 < k/2, that can be expressed in terms of the model's parameters (see (9)): 17
Let a = 1, and denote by x a=1 the smallest realization of the signal that makes the interim total surplus positive, namely, x a=1 is the refinancing/liquidation cut-off. 18 We calculate the ex-ante total surplus, and assume it to be strictly negative:
This guarantees that when a = 1 the project is not worth financing, and therefore, contracts do not exist, whether debt-equity or convertible debt, such that the ex-ante payoffs of the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist are positive.
So far, we have been concerned with the total ex-ante surplus and the corresponding refinancing/liquidation cut-off values x a=0 and x a=1 . In an analogous manner, we can define and derive the refinancing/liquidation cut-off values for the venture capitalist, x a=0 and x a=1 . E.g., x a=0 is the smallest realization of the signal that makes the interim payoff of the venture capitalist positive when a = 0. Since the relevant expressions are long, we will introduce them later, as the need arises.
Summarizing, signal manipulation reduces the probability that the project will be liquidated, but at the same time, also reduces the benefit of introducing stage financing (i.e.
reduces the venture capitalist's value of the option to abandon the project) rendering the 17 The assumption is stronger than necessary, but it simplifies computations. 18 Assumption (11) ensures that the refinancing/liquidation cut-off, x a=1 , is unique. To see this, determine
which is the analogue of equation (8) for the case a = 1. Then, using the definition of q h (x, 1) (see (3) Figure 1) , and notice that q h (x, 0) equals k at x = k (point B in Figure 1 ). It is easily verified that k/2 < k , so by assumption (11) we have x a=0 < k . It follows that x a=1 is the unique solution of x / (x + 1 − k) = x a=0 (see the definition of q h (x, 1), above). project nonviable. In the next sub-section we will show that, nevertheless, once debt-equity financing has been obtained, the entrepreneur will always want to manipulate the signal.
Analysis
Given the contract that is in effect, the entrepreneur decides whether to manipulate the signal so as to maximize his ex-ante payoff. We begin by showing that for any straight debt-equity contract, the entrepreneur will manipulate the signal, and, to underline the loss of surplus that this entails, the model's parameters are such that, with signal manipulation, debt-equity financing will not take place in the first place (assumption (12) above). We will then show that, for the same parameter values, there is a convertible debt contract, (d 0 , s 0 , γ, s), such that the entrepreneur will not manipulate the signal and, therefore, the project will be financed.
Signal manipulation with debt-equity financing
We now establish Proposition 1: If the project is financed with a debt-equity contract, (d, s), the entrepreneur will manipulate the signal, i.e., in equilibrium, we must have a = 1.
Proof. We begin by showing that if the project is financed with a debt-equity contract, a = 0 cannot be part of an equilibrium. Consider an arbitrary debt-equity contract, (d, s), and its corresponding liquidation cut-off value x a=0 , i.e., the value of x that makes the venture capitalist indifferent between liquidating and refinancing. Since the venture capitalist obtains part of the total ex-ante surplus, according to the cash-flow sharing rule defined by the debt-equity contract, we have x a=0 > x a=0 (the inequality is strict since we are assuming throughout s < 1).
Suppose (by way of contradiction) that, in equilibrium, the entrepreneur indeed chooses a = 0. His ex-ante payoff is 19
If he deviates, choosing a = 1 (while the venture capitalist believes that a = 0), his payoff becomes
where
α h (x, 1) dx is the ex-ante probability of refinancing and state h occuring,
α h (x, 1) dx is the ex-ante probability of refinancing and state l occuring (as in the second row of (10)). These probabilities vary according to whether x a=0 is smaller than k, larger than (1 + k)/2, or between the two. We study each case in turn, and show that the entrepreneur's payoff always increases by deviating to a = 1.
Suppose x a=0 ≤ k. Then, since the rightward shift of mass in state h does not affect
α h (x, 0) dx (as x a=0 lies to the left of k; see Figure 1 ), φ h does not change. By contrast, the ex-ante probability of refinancing and state l occurring is affected by the rightward shift:
implying that the entrepreneur's ex-ante payoff is strictly higher with a = 1 than with a = 0. (Notice that in this case, the increase in the ex-ante payoff as a result of signal manipulation is entirely driven by this increase in the probability of refinancing if the state is l, i.e., if the project is bad.)
19 The computation is analogous to that in (10).
, and φ l = 1+k 2
implying that the payoff of the entrepreneur when a = 1 is strictly higher than with a = 0.
Finally, suppose that x a=0 > (1 + k)/2. Then, since the rightward shift of mass in state l does not affect
α l (x, 0) dx (as x a=0 lies to the right of (1 + k)/2; see Figure 1 ), φ l does not change. By contrast, the ex-ante probability of refinancing and state h occurring is affected by the rightward shift:
, implying that the payoff of the entrepreneur when a = 1 is strictly higher than with a = 0. Therefore, a = 0 cannot be part of an equilibrium.
Using the same logic, it follows that if (for some reason) the project is financed at time 0 with a straight debt-equity contract, the entrepreneur manipulates the signal (a = 1).
Consider (d, s) and its corresponding liquidation point x a=1 . In the above expressions for φ l and φ h , replace x a=0 by x a=1 . Then, by analogous reasoning, the entrepreneur's payoff when a = 1 is strictly larger than when a = 0, for any value of x a=1 , so in equilibrium, there is signal manipulation, a = 1. 2
We have demonstrated that if the venture capitalist agrees to finance the project, it is optimal for the entrepreneur to manipulate the signal, rendering the project non-viable ex-ante. Thus, a project which is profitable provided there is no signal manipulation, will not be financed with a straight debt-equity contract because straight debt-equity fails to provide the incentives for no signal manipulation.
The role of convertible debt in preventing signal manipulation
We will show that with an appropriately designed financing scheme that combines equity, debt, and convertible securities, the project will be financed, and the entrepreneur will not engage in signal manipulation. The proposed contract induces the venture capitalist to refinance the project if the signal exceeds a threshold, and to convert the entire amount of debt if the signal exceeds a yet higher threshold. Given this behavior of the venture capitalist, the entrepreneur refrains from manipulating the signal, and thus, the venture capitalist agrees to provide seed financing at time 0. The result is summarized in:
Proposition 2: There is a convertible debt contract,
there is no signal manipulation, a = 0, and the project is financed. The choice of γ, the conversion ratio, and s, the venture capitalist's post-conversion share of the enterprise, play a key role in the construction of the contract. If γ is low, 20 Typically, there will be many such contracts. The choice among them will depend on the relative bargaining power of entrepreneur and venture capitalist which will determine the division of surplus between them. If the contract satisfies d = d0 − γ(s − s0) ≥ 0, it consists of only convertible debt; if it satisfies d = d0 − γ(s − s0) < 0, it consists of convertible debt cum warrants. The economic intuition in both cases is the same, as was explained above.
converting debt into equity is cheap and the venture capitalist will always convert debt if he decides to refinance the project. If γ is high, the venture capitalist will never convert debt. In both cases, the option to convert plays no role as a threat that prevents signal manipulation. A conversion ratio, γ, that is not too high nor too low must be selected to provide incentives for the entrepreneur. The attributes "low" and "high" depend, of course, on s, the venture capitalist's post-conversion share of the enterprise. The higher s, the smaller the entrepreneur's post-conversion share of the enterprise, the larger the "punishment" for signal manipulation, and the larger γ can be and still be effective. The γ and s that jointly succeed in preventing signal manipulation are such that when the venture capitalist chooses to convert debt, conversion takes place at a convenient rate for the venture capitalist and hurts the entrepreneur (in other words, the venture capitalist buys underpriced equity). This threat induces the entrepreneur to refrain from engaging in signal manipulation.
Conditional on a decision by the venture capitalist to refinance and convert debt (i.e., conditional on a signal realization x ≥ x 1 ), there is no renegotiation of the conversion ratio, γ, and the amount of debt that can be converted. There can be no mutual gain at time 1 from changing the terms of the contract-since the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist are both risk neutral, any such change will benefit one party at the expense of the other. 21 The first step of the proof establishes that there are values d 0 , s 0 , and a corresponding refinancing/liquidation cut-off, x 0 (the value of x that makes the venture capitalist indifferent between liquidating and refinancing), 22 such that when the entrepreneur does not manipulate the signal, the ex-ante payoff of the venture capitalist, computed with these initial debt and equity positions and cut-off value, is strictly positive. Furthermore, we 21 We ignore for the moment, as we did in the previous sub-section for debt-equity contracts, the possibility of renegotiating the liquidation decision. We will show, in Section 3, that the possibility of such renegotiation does not change the basic insight.
22 To simplify the exposition, we do not use in the proof the notation "x a=0 " that we have been using until now. It should be understood that x0 is the analogue of the refinancing/liquidation cut-off value x a=0 that corresponds to the debt-equity contract (d0, s0).
show that d 0 and s 0 can be chosen so that x 0 < k. 23 Since the ex-ante total surplus when there is signal manipulation is strictly negative, the payoff of the venture capitalist is also strictly negative for any debt-equity or convertible debt contract and any refinancing/liquidation cut-off. Thus, to ensure that the project is viable we will have to show that, in equilibrium, a = 0.
In determining γ, s, and x 1 , the debt conversion cut-off value of the signal, we want to ensure that the venture capitalist does not convert any debt after observing x ∈ (x 0 , x 1 ), but converts the maximal amount of debt allowed after observing x ≥ x 1 . To exploit the model's "natural structure," we design the convertible debt contract so that
Recalling that q(x, 0) = x, and using the expressions for the venture capitalist's interim payoffs (equations (4) and (6)), we want to choose γ and s such that the following condition is satisfied
Condition (15) states that the signal realization x = (1 + k)/2 renders the venture capitalist indifferent between not converting any debt and converting the entire amount of debt.
Therefore, if x > (1+k)/2, he strictly prefers to convert the entire amount of debt compared to the alternative of not converting any debt. Manipulating (15)-see the Appendix for details-yields
23 These facts are established using (a) the assumption that the total ex-ante surplus of the project, for a = 0, is strictly positive (equation (10)); (b) the continuity of the venture capitalist's payoff in d, s, and in the refinancing/liquidation cut-off value of the signal; and (c) the fact that exercising the option to convert debt can only increase the venture capitalist's payoff. Also used is assumption (11), although it should be noted that it is a sufficient condition which is way too strong for this purpose, but it allows us to simplify the exposition; see the Appendix for details.
It still remains to be established that, given the contract that is in effect, these are the only payoff relevant alternatives, namely, that converting part of the debt is strictly dominated by either "no conversion" or "full conversion." We address this issue shortly. Condition (16) defines an implicit relation between γ and s. Throughout the remainder of the proof, we will require that this equality be satisfied. Thus, any argument involving a change in γ entails a change in s so that (16) is satisfied and, consequently, the debt conversion cut-off value of the signal remains
It is convenient to define the variable t ≡ γ(s − s 0 ) that appears on both sides of (16).
It is then shown that as t approaches infinity, so does γ, but s approaches unity at a faster rate than the rate at which e λ h γ(s−s 0 ) , on the left hand side of (16), approaches infinity.
These seemingly technical results (that are proven in the Appendix) play an important role in pinning down the desired contract, and have sound economic intuition that will be explained later.
Next, we impose a condition that ensures that the entrepreneur prefers not to manipulate the signal. Given the convertible debt contract and the cut-off values, x 0 and x 1 = (1+k)/2, his ex-ante payoff with a = 0 is larger than his ex-ante payoff with a = 1 (when the venture capitalist believes that a = 0), namely, it does not pay for the entrepreneur to deviate from a = 0 to a = 1. Spelling out this condition explicitly is tedious (see the Appendix), but after manipulation it boils down to the following inequality:
(Notice that x 0 < k ensures that the right hand side is strictly positive.)
Consider (16), and increase t. The right hand side decreases approaching zero, and so must the left hand side in order to preserve the equality. But the left hand side of (16) is equal to the left hand side of (17). Therefore, since the right hand side of (17) is fixed (it does not contain terms involving γ or s), for t large enough, the inequality in (17) (16) and (17) hold.
In the final step of the proof we establish that, given such a contract, the interim payoff of the venture capitalist, as a function of his post-conversion equity stake, achieves a unique interior minimum on the interval (s 0 , s). Therefore, the venture capitalist's interim payoff is maximized either at s 0 -"no debt conversion," or at s-"full debt conversion," and the formulation of conditions (15) and (17) is consistent with optimization by the venture capitalist.
In showing these results, we make use of the fact, mentioned above, that as t and γ increase, γ(1−s) approaches zero. The intuition for this fact is as follows. On the one hand,
γ cannot be too low, or the venture capitalist will convert debt for all x ≥ x 0 . On the other hand, γ cannot be too large, or the venture capitalist will never convert debt. Increasing γ and, at the same time, increasing s at a faster rate, achieves the correct balance between terms of conversion that are not too favorable to the venture capitalist, yet constitute a sufficient threat for the entrepreneur in that the purchased equity is underpriced. 24
The deadline for conversion Until now we have been assuming that the deadline for debt conversion was strictly prior to time 2, and we argued that this was a realistic feature. We want to show that, indeed, it is not optimal for the parties to set the deadline for conversion at time 2, after full realization of uncertainty. The argument is simple: if the deadline for conversion were at time 2, the venture capitalist would wait until time 2, when he will have more information, to decide whether to convert debt and how much to convert. This decision would, therefore, be independent of the realization of the signal (that is observed at time 1). But then the logic behind Proposition 1 applies: since the threat of debt conversion at a favorable conversion 24 Further intuition is provided in the Appendix where all the steps of the proof are worked out in detail.
ratio in response to a good signal is no longer present, the entrepreneur has an incentive to manipulate the signal in order to reduce the probability of liquidation. As a consequence, the project will not be financed. The parties have a common interest to set the deadline for debt conversion strictly before time 2. Then, they can write a convertible debt contract such that the entrepreneur will not manipulate the signal and, hence, the project will be undertaken.
Allowing for Renegotiation of Contracts
We argued that a convertible debt contract is superior to a straight debt-equity contract since it prevents signal manipulation by the entrepreneur. We assumed that both contracts could not be renegotiated at the interim stage, after the signal is observed by the parties.
In this section we consider this possibility. Our main purpose is to determine whether introducing renegotiation of debt-equity contracts can achieve efficiency without using convertible debt. But for the sake of completeness, we start by looking at the renegotiation of convertible debt contracts. 25
In the previous section we constructed a convertible debt contract that guaranteed that, in equilibrium, the entrepreneur would not manipulate the signal. We showed that, conditional on refinancing, the conversion rate, γ, was renegotiation proof. We study now the issue of the renegotiation of the liquidation decision. Consider a contract, (d 0 , s 0 , γ, s), and suppose that renegotiation of the contract is allowed at time 1, after observing the signal, x. If the venture capitalist chooses to refinance the project, then there is no scope for renegotiation. This follows from the linearity of the payoffs (risk neutrality): any gain to one party is a loss to the other. Renegotiation will happen if, after observing the signal, the interim payoff of the venture capitalist is negative but the total interim surplus from continuation is positive. In other words, after observing a signal x ∈ (x a=0 , x a=0 ) the venture capitalist chooses to liquidate, but it would be efficient to continue the project.
In such cases, renegotiation that induces the venture capitalist to refinance creates surplus that can be split between the parties by agreeing on a new contract.
There is no renegotiation only if x a=0 = x a=0 , which can happen only if s 0 = 1. This is incongruent with a basic assumption of our model-that the payoff of the entrepreneur cannot be exactly zero, otherwise he will not exert any effort in order for the project to succeed. 26 In previous sections, this feature was captured by the assumption s < 1 (and hence, s 0 < 1). Here, it is more convenient to make the (almost equivalent) assumption that there is a smallest strictly positive expected payoff that must be guaranteed to the entrepreneur at the interim stage. Therefore, even after renegotiation the venture capitalist cannot own one hundred percent of the equity, implying that the debt and equity components of the renegotiated contract are such that the corresponding refinancing/liquidation cut-off satisfies x a=0 > x a=0 .
Constructing a renegotiation-proof convertible debt contract is now very easy. Simply choose, to begin with, values d 0 and s 0 such that the corresponding cut-off value of the signal, x a=0 , is the minimal possible (i.e., it leaves the entrepreneur with the minimally acceptable stake). By construction, the liquidation decision is not renegotiable, and Proposition 2 goes through as stated. 27 We now turn to the issue we are most interested in: is there a role for convertible debt when debt-equity can be renegotiated?
If debt-equity contracts can be renegotiated, is there a need for convertible debt financing?
We are going to show that, in the spirit of Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1994) , if we can write in the debt-equity contract how the parties should renegotiate (or if the default renegotiation happens to be the optimal one), then the debt-equity contract (plus renego-
26
In the next section, we introduce a choice of long-term effort, and show that to induce the entrepreneur to exert such effort, he must remain the owner of part, albeit small, of the enterprise.
27 The only requirement we imposed on x0 in the proof of Proposition 2 was that x0 < k. Given that the renegotiation-proof value of x0 is the smallest possible, this requirement is even more easily satisfied. tiation) is equivalent to convertible debt financing. However, we will also show that such renegotiation is quite complex and is unlikely to be the natural way in which parties renegotiate. Convertible debt contracts can be interpreted as a manner to design (and specify in the initial agreement) the renegotiation scheme that prevents signal manipulation.
The following reasoning illustrates why renegotiation of debt-equity contracts can prevent signal manipulation, saving the need for convertible debt financing. Define x min > x a=0 as the minimum cut-off value with a = 0 which is renegotiation-proof, following the logic of the previous subsection. One way to make the capital structure contingent on x would be to choose a debt-equity contract with a corresponding liquidation cut-off value, x a=0 , that is higher than x min . Then, after observing a signal x min < x < x a=0 , which would induce the venture capitalist to liquidate, the two parties will instead renegotiate. If the payoffs of the renegotiated debt-equity contract mimic closely those that would have been obtained with a convertible debt contract, then signal manipulation would be prevented and financing provided. We turn to an analysis of whether it is reasonable to expect this to occur, in the framework of our model. Let us start by illustrating, with an extreme case, how to construct a debt-equity contract and its renegotiation such that the entrepreneur will not manipulate the signal. Consider the contract (d,s) such that x a=0 = 1. In other words, the debt-equity contract leaves so little to the venture capitalist that he always wants to liquidate. Then there is renegotiation for any x min < x < 1. Notice that the renegotiated contract does not have to be the same after observing different realizations of x. For example, due to exogenous circumstances the bargaining power of the parties may differ according to the realization of the signal, so that the renegotiated contract would be different in each case. In that event, a = 0 may be part of an equilibrium.
To show how this can be achieved, consider a convertible debt contract (d 0 , s 0 , γ, s) that satisfies Proposition 2, such that the project is liquidated following x < x min , the entire amount of debt is converted following x ≥ (1 + k)/2, and a = 0. Now consider the above mentioned debt-equity contract (d,s), and assume that renegotiation conditions are such that after any x min < x < (1 + k)/2 the renegotiated contract is (d 0 , s 0 ) and after any
. This renegotiated debt-equity contract yields identical payoffs to those obtained with the convertible debt contract. Therefore, the equilibrium behavior of the entrepreneur must be the same, i.e. a = 0.
This example illustrates how with renegotiation we can find a debt-equity contract which is equivalent, in terms of effect on signal manipulation and payoffs, to a convertible debt contract. However, the example also shows how difficult it is to achieve this result. In fact, it relies heavily on exogenous circumstances, requiring that the terms of renegotiation (such as outside options, bargaining power, etc.) must be such that the final cash-flow allocations are those achieved under the convertible debt contract constructed in the previous section. 28 This is a very limiting requirement, and in general, we should not expect it to be fulfilled. In contrast, preventing signal manipulation with the aid of appropriately designed convertible debt contracts does not rely on such exogenous circumstances.
The relation to Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1994) should now be apparent. They show that if the parties can write in the contract how to conduct the renegotiation in future contingencies, the inefficiency arising from the nonverifiability of interim signals can be eliminated. The intuition here is analogous: there is a particular type of renegotiation that would eliminate the inefficiency (i.e. entail a = 0). We may be so lucky that such renegotiation would take place spontaneously. But we have just illustrated that this type of renegotiation is very specific and complex. In most cases, it is easy to imagine that the renegotiation will not yield the desired final allocation, so we must write in the contract how this renegotiation will take place. The debt conversion clause can be interpreted as a particular (and easy) manner of implementing contractually the optimal type of renegotiation. In fact, the convertible debt contract gives a great deal of bargaining power to the venture capitalist (he decides whether to convert), but it also sets limits to his power since the terms of conversion, i.e. γ, are set in advance so as not to be too unfavorable to the entrepreneur.
Long-term effort
The literature has often focused on the "long-term effort" of entrepreneurs (and managers), namely, on their contribution to profits in the long-run. For expositional reasons, our analysis abstracted from this feature, but the basic short-run versus long-run trade-off is implicit in our model, as we will now demonstrate. One may imagine that the entrepreneur, in order to undertake short-term effort (signal manipulation), would reduce long-term effort. This shift of resources away from long-term effort constitutes an additional cost of short-termism.
We now incorporate in the model such a choice for the entrepreneur, in the simplest possible way, since the purpose of this section is simply to show that the introduction of long-term effort does not affect our result.
Suppose the entrepreneur can make two types of effort: short-term effort, a = 0, 1, which is exactly the signal manipulation described in previous sections, and long term effort, = 0, 1. We assume that both a and involve a cost c that is born by the entrepreneur, and that the entrepreneur can only exert one of the two types of effort (or none). 29 If a = 0 and = 1 (the entrepreneur exerts long-term effort and does not manipulate the signal), then the joint distribution of signal and output is that described in previous sections when a = 0. If, instead, = 0, then, whether a = 0 or a = 1, the ex-ante probability of the good state of nature, h, is reduced by ψ, and the ex-ante probability of state l increases by ψ.
A simple way to introduce this change is to assume that the mass ψ is subtracted from α h and added to α l over the central interval [k, To render the trade-off between short-and long-term effort interesting, we assume that, from the perspective of joint profit maximization, = 1 is optimal (total expected benefits exceed the cost):
The entrepreneur will exert long-term effort only if his payoff increases by more than the cost of exerting the effort:
Abstracting for the moment from the decision whether to manipulate the signal, it is evident that if a = 0, condition (19) is necessary for = 1, and a necessary condition for (19) to hold is s < 1. Thus, if (18) is satisfied, the venture capitalist will want to induce the entrepreneur to exert long-term effort, and will insist on a debt-equity contract with s < 1 that satisfies (19). The need to induce the entrepreneur to exert long-term effort thus provides the justification for our assumption in previous sections that in any debt-equity contract, the venture capitalist does not own one hundred percent of the project's equity. 30 We now turn to the analysis of the model where both a and are chosen by the entrepreneur. It proceeds in an almost analogous manner to that of previous sections, so to economize on space, we will only sketch the main arguments. Condition (2) is preserved, namely, stage financing is necessary. The socially efficient liquidation cutoff value remains the same if a = 0 and = 1, but increases if a = 0 and = 0 since the overall prospects of the project are less favorable. We use the following selfexplanatory notation: x a=0, =0 > x a=0, =1 ≡ x a=0 . Similarly, for a = 1 and = 0 we have
Condition (10) is preserved: without signal manipulation (a = 0) and with long-term ef-fort ( = 1) the project will be financed. Moreover, we assume that with signal manipulation (a = 1) but without long-term effort ( = 0) the project will not be financed:
where q h , α h , and α l denote q h (x, a = 1, = 0), α h (x, a = 1, = 0), and α l (x, a = 1, = 0).
Conditions (10) and (20) together imply that the absence of signal manipulation is necessary for the project to be financed.
We obtain a result that is analogous to Proposition 1: with debt-equity financing only a = 1 and = 0 can happen in equilibrium, provided ψ is low enough. We now sketch the proof. Given a contract (d, s), with corresponding cut-off value for the venture capitalist,
, if in equilibrium a = 0 and = 1, the ex-ante payoff of the entrepreneur is
If (19) is satisfied, deviating to a = = 0 is not worthwhile, but by deviating to a = 1 and = 0 the entrepreneur obtains the payoff 31
which is higher if ψ is small enough. This is quite intuitive: if long-term effort is very important then manipulating the signal may not be worthwhile, but if it is not, then the entrepreneur will choose to manipulate the signal reducing long-term profits. By similar arguments, analogous to those made in previous sections, we can show that conditional on debt-equity financing at time 0, a = 1 and = 0 are optimal for the entrepreneur and, hence, the project will not be financed at time 0.
31 We write here the payoff only for the case in which x a=0, =1 < k. The other cases can be derived in a similar way.
Convertible debt solves this problem in exactly the same manner as above. The conditions ensuring that the venture capitalist refinances the project without converting debt following x 0 , and converts debt following x 1 , remain the same. The condition ensuring that in equilibrium a = 1 and = 0 is
This condition is more easily satisfied than (17) because of the additional last term in the numerator, which is always positive. That term represents exactly the loss in expected profits due to the fact that the entrepreneur does not exert long-term effort. The intuition is clear: we have added an additional cost to manipulating a signal (the reduction in long-term profits) which makes it easier to induce the entrepreneur not to deviate from the desired behavior.
Alternative Specifications of the Joint Distribution of Signal and Output
We have been studying one particular way in which window dressing can affect the joint distribution of signal and output, the one presented in Figure 1 . We briefly discussed the robustness of this case and the characteristics that are essential for our main result. In this section, we look in greater detail at one new case and at the two cases, presented in Figures 2 and 3, that we have already discussed. In the first case, convertible debt prevents window dressing, and is beneficial to both parties, as in the case studied in previous sections. In the second, convertible debt succeeds in preventing signal manipulation, but, unlike previous cases, window dressing is not inefficient since it increases the precision of the signal. This is beneficial to the venture capitalist and may counterbalance the fact that the project is seldom liquidated (since when it is liquidated it is definitely a bad project). In this case, the tension between venture capitalist and entrepreneur does not arise and, in particular, the venture capitalist will not try to hinder signal manipulation. Finally, we present a case where window dressing is harmful, but the use of convertible securities does not help.
Case 1. Let the joint densities α h (x, 0), α l (x, 0), and α h (x, 1) remain unchanged, and assume that α l (x, 1) is as shown in Figure 4 . 32 It is easily checked that the area below α l (x, 1) remains one half. This type of shift represents a situation where, when the project is "bad," the probability of observing different values of the signal is constant over a large interval (from 0 to √ 2k). In other words, the entrepreneur succeeds in manipulating the short-term performance so that, when the project is "bad," poor interim performance is as likely as a medium performance. Since the purpose of this section is mainly to show how our analysis can be applied to different distribution shifts, we simplify the analysis by
(otherwise we would need to study two different sub-cases).
The analysis, in the main, is very similar to that of previous sections. In particular, it is easy to see that the same logic of Proposition 1 carries through and a = 0 is never part of an equilibrium since, for a given liquidation cut-off value, x a=0 , the entrepreneur can increase the probability that the project is refinanced by manipulating the signal. We can then construct a convertible debt contract such that in equilibrium a = 0, and the venture capitalist is indifferent whether to convert all the debt or convert none after observing
, and condition (15) holds for this debt conversion cut-off. Condition (17), which guarantees that in equilibrium the entrepreneur does not want to deviate from a = 0, does however change, becoming:
32 In this section, we change one "α" each time, since the probabilities and payoffs are simpler to recompute and, at the same time, the entire intuition is conveyed.
We can prove that if k is not too high, the right hand side is strictly positive so that as γ approaches infinity, s approaches unity at a faster rate, and the left hand side approaches zero, and the inequality is eventually satisfied; the remaining analysis in the Appendix also holds.
Finally, notice that, as illustrated in Figure 4 , the conditional probability, q h (x, 1), is monotonic increasing, highlighting our claim that the non-monotonicity of q h (x, 1) in previous sections did not drive any of the results.
Case 2. Consider Figure 2 . The joint densities α h (x, 0), α l (x, 0), and α l (x, 1) remain unchanged but α h (x, 1), and therefore q h (x, 1), are different. In this case, signal manipulation by the entrepreneur is very effective in making sure that a good project will never exhibit poor performance in the short-term. In fact, q h (x, 1) = 0 for low values of the signal: when observing very low interim performance, the venture capitalist is sure that the project is bad, makes the efficient decision and liquidates.
For low values of the signal, q h (x, 1) < q h (x, 0), implying that x a=1 < x a=0 , i.e, the venture capitalist liquidates more often when a = 1 (since low signals are more precise).
Moreover, the higher precision of the signal increases the ex-ante payoff of the venture capitalist. Therefore, this type of signal manipulation turns out to be beneficial for the venture capitalist. There is no need to use convertible securities, since short-termism does not constitute a problem. We can show, using the same steps as in the Appendix, that also in this case an appropriately designed convertible debt contract will ensure that in equilibrium, a = 0.
If we compare the shifts of mass in Figures 1 and 2 , we see that they are both extreme cases: in the first, signal manipulation does not improve at all the short-term performance of "good" projects, while in the second, signal manipulation is one hundred percent effective in improving short-term performance of "bad" projects. The most realistic case would probably be a combination of the two, where α h (x, 1) is as represented in Figure 3 . In this case, signal manipulation improves the (very poor) short term performance of both "bad" and "good" projects. Depending on which effect dominates, signal manipulation by the entrepreneur is beneficial or not to the venture capitalist. Whenever the venture capitalist decides that he wants to prevent signal manipulation, he can use convertible securities to achieve this.
Case 3. Finally, let us consider a case in which the venture capitalist would like to prevent window dressing, but convertible debt is not helpful. Assume that α h (x, 0) = α h (x, 1), but signal manipulation changes α l as in Figure 1 . Window dressing improves the shortterm performance of "bad" projects only, but never of "good" projects. First of all, this is clearly not beneficial to the venture capitalist, since it increases his chances of refinancing poor projects. It is easy to see the intuition for why in this case using convertible debt cannot prevent signal manipulation. The threat of debt conversion is not effective since the venture capitalist is bound to convert debt more often with poor projects. This highlights a central feature of our model-convertible debt is effective in preventing signal manipulation when the entrepreneur, in the attempt to improve short-term performance, improves the short-term performance of both poor and profitable projects.
Concluding Remarks
We have illustrated that convertible securities dominate a simple mix of debt and equity in stage financing situations. When the venture capitalist retains the option to abandon the project if in the medium term he receives bad news, the entrepreneur has an incentive to engage in "window dressing" or short-termism, and bias the interim news in order to reduce the probability that the project will be liquidated. Convertible debt reduces the incentives to engage in such short-termism through the threat of debt conversion. In practice, debt may or may not be converted into shares depending on the information received at the interim stage of the venture.
The fundamental role of the debt conversion option is to adjust the ownership (debtequity) structure to such new information. This feature resembles provisions allowing the provider of financing to alter the financial structure of an existing contract at some interim stage in response to nonverifiable information, a feature that is very common in incomplete contracts environments. The need to commit in advance to the terms of debt conversion is in line with Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1994) who show that, by specifying in the contract the bargaining procedure to be used in future renegotiations, the efficient outcome can be achieved.
Venture capital convertible debt contracts sometimes incorporate, in addition to the voluntary debt conversion, automatic conversion agreements, where debt is converted if certain profit, sales, or performance milestones are attained. 33 In such situations, where the signal that triggers conversion is verifiable, there is no gain from endowing the financier with the power to unilaterally alter the debt-equity structure by converting debt. In situations where the signal that triggers conversion is not verifiable (e.g., failure to attract sufficiently motivated personnel to the research program), authority to unilaterally change the terms of the contract is crucial. Our model captures well the contingent financial structure aspect that is relevant for both types of situations, and is especially suitable for settings where interim signals are not commonly and immediately verifiable.
33 Gompers (1996, Table 4 ) and Kaplan and Strömberg (1999) document the large use of such agreements.
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2
Step 1. There are values d 0 , s 0 , and a corresponding refinancing/liquidation cut-off, x 0 (the value of x that makes the venture capitalist indifferent between liquidating and refinancing), such that when the entrepreneur does not manipulate the signal, the ex-ante payoff of the venture capitalist, computed with these initial debt and equity positions and cut-off value, is strictly positive. Furthermore, d 0 and s 0 can be chosen so that x 0 < k.
To show this, consider the venture capitalist's ex-ante payoff from a debt-equity contract (d, s), when a = 0, and with the refinancing/liquidation cut-off, x a=0 . This payoff is computed in an analogous way to the total ex-ante surplus in (10), and is given by
where x a=0 is determined by
and q(x a=0 , 0) = x, as in (8). As d increases and s approaches unity, the generic expression 1 − e −λd (1 − s) approaches unity, so by equations (26) and (8), x a=0 approaches x a=0 .
Therefore, by the strict inequality in (10), namely, by the assumption that the total ex-ante surplus with a = 0 and efficient liquidation is strictly positive, there are values d 0 , s 0 , and a value of x a=0 that we denote x 0 , such that the expression in (25) is strictly positive. By the assumption x a=0 < k/2 that was made towards the end of sub-section 2.1, d 0 , s 0 , and the corresponding x 0 can be chosen so that x 0 < k.
Step 2. Given the values d 0 and s 0 that were determined in the previous step, we impose the following condition on γ and s: 
(This is precisely condition (15) in the main text.) Recalling the expressions for the venture capitalist's interim payoffs (equations (4) and (6)), and that q(x, 0) = x, condition (27) states that the signal realization x = (1 + k)/2 renders the venture capitalist indifferent between not converting any debt and converting the entire amount of debt and, therefore, 
Multiplying through by e λ h γ(s−s 0 ) , and then dividing the numerator and denominator of the right hand side by this magnitude, we obtain 
This is precisely equation (16)). This condition defines an implicit relation between γ and s. Throughout the remainder of the proof, we will require that this equality be satisfied.
Thus, any argument involving a change in γ entails a change in s so that (27), (29) and (28) are satisfied and, consequently, the debt conversion cut-off value of the signal remains
From the definition of t it follows that as t approaches infinity, γ also approaches infinity (since s − s 0 is bounded). Since γ(1 − s) converges to zero, s approaches unity at a faster rate than the rate at which γ approaches infinity.
The above limit behavior, as t becomes large, uses equations (32) and (28) which are both derived from (27), the condition that states that when the realization of the signal is x = (1 + k)/2, the venture capitalist indifferent between not converting any debt and converting the entire amount of debt.
Step 5. Consider (29), and increase t. The right hand side decreases approaching zero, and so must the left hand side in order to preserve the equality. But the left hand side of (29) is equal to the left hand side of (31). Therefore, since the right hand side of (31) is fixed (it does not contain terms involving γ or s), for t large enough, the inequality in (31) must hold. Thus, there are values of γ and s that, combined with the values d 0 , s 0 , and x 0 chosen above, ensure that both (29) and (31) hold. Consequently, there is a value t 1 such that for t ≥ t 1 the entrepreneur does not gain by deviating from a = 0 to a = 1.
Step 6. By the fact that, for γ and s satisfying (27), γ(1 − s) approaches zero (step 4), it follows that there is a value t 2 such that for t ≥ t 2 , 1 λ h − γ(1 −ŝ) evaluated ats is strictly positive.
It follows that the first derivative of the venture capitalist's interim payoff is strictly negative to the left of s, strictly positive to the right ofs, and zero at s * ∈ (s,s). An analogous set of arguments applies to the second derivative of the venture capitalist's interim payoff, which is is strictly negative to the left of s , strictly positive to the right ofs , zero at s * * ∈ (s ,s ), where s ands satisfy Thus, the interim payoff of the venture capitalist, as a function of his post-conversion equity stake, achieves a unique interior minimum on the interval (s 0 , s). Therefore, the function is maximized either at s 0 -"no debt conversion," or at s-"full debt conversion."
It follows that the formulation of conditions (27) and (31) 
